University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

Winter 2013

Click to Agree
James Gibson
University of Richmond, jgibson@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Contracts Commons
Recommended Citation
James Gibson, Click To Agree, Rich. L. Mag., Winter 2013, at 16.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

I
1\

We don't ignore price.
Why do we ignore boilerplate contracts?

ast year, I bought four computers. I didn't really
need them. It's a long story. It's a story about
the market, about contract law, and about the
Power-or lack of power-of consumers like
you and me.
As Americans, we have great faith in the power of the
free market. And rightly so. Adam Smith's invisible hand is an
unTivaled engine of economic prosperity. Its genius lies in its
decentralization, its reliance on the collective power of billions of
private, individual decisions about what to sell, what to buy, and
how much to pay. This decentralization ineans that if a seller sets
its price too high (or makes its quality too low), the govern1nent
does not have to do anything. The market will take care of it by
driving consumers to a competing seller with a lower price (or
higher quality).
In theory, the invisible hand governs contracts as well, keeping their terms competitive. Salary too low? Bargain with your
employer by demonstrating that others would offer you more.
Interested in buying that nite yeUow house with the picket fence?
Once you remind the owner that"-there are other houses out there,
you have the leverage to haggle over repairs, closing date, and
whether the washer and dryer convey.
But despite what we learn in law school about offer, counteroffer, and the ineeting of the minds, the vast majority of consumer
contracts are contracts of adhesion-standard-form boilerplate
that consumers either accept or reject wholesale.
In theory, this lack of negotiation presents no problem. So you
can't bargain for different contract terms. So what? No one haggles
with a supermarket cashier over the price of a loaf of bread, how
thinly it is sliced, or whether it's covered by a warranty. If you don't
like the pricing or the slicing, just take your business elsewhere. Our
collective power as consumers drives unwanted terms out of the
marketplace. Competition, not negotiation, is the answer.
Like price, a contract term is just a feature of the transaction.
If you don't like the contract, just walk away. When you walk
away, you're signaling to the invisible hand to come down hard
on that seller.
But does the theory work in practice? Consider this: A couple
of years ago, a British video game retailer hatched an April Fool's
Day scheme. Buried deep in its online sales contract, to which
customers had to agree when making a purchase, was the following term: "By placing an order via this Web
site on the first day of the fourth month of
the year 2010 Anno Domini, you agree
to grant Us a non transferable option to
claim, for now and for ever more, your
itnmortal soul."
1~he fine print described how the company
could exercise its option, including serving notice

1n 6 (six) foot high letters of fire." But if you were an attentive customer and you wanted to hold onto your soul-or had
"already given it to another party"-you could opt out of the
provision by clicking a link. Those who did were rewarded with a
discount offer and the chance to win free games.
You can guess what happened. The vast majority of customers never clicked the link. ~fhey simply agreed to the entire contract without reading it.
We've all been there. We've all installed some new software
on a computer or made a purchase on some website. Up pops a
long, undifferentiated mass of legalese. Despite our legal training,
what do we do? We breeze right past the terms, click on "I Agree,"
and get on with our lives. By doing so, we fail to send any signal
to the marketplace about the content of the contract.
Why don't we read these terms? Courts take them seriously, so
why don't we? We don't ignore price. Why do we ignore contracts?
Perhaps we're just lazy and get what we deserve when we
become bound to contracts we never read. That's the attitude that
contract law takes: As long as we have an opportunity to read,
and we indicate our assent, the fact that we didn't read makes no
difference to a court.
But at a certain point, the failure to read may be more smart
than slothful. If the boilerplate is too long or arrives too late in
the transaction, the cost of reading and rejecting it may exceed
the benefit-even if we don't like its terms. We may rationally
decide to allocate our limited time and attention to something
other than fine print.
Which explanation is correct? Are we lazy, or are we smart?
It's hard to answer that question in the abstract because some form
contracts are shorter, more accessible, and easier to understand
than others. It's a context-specific inquiry. And as I mulled over
these issues last year, I found myself searching for a way to give
the inquiry some context.
So I bought four co1nputers.
I bought one computer fi·om each of the top four sellers of Windows-based systems (Acer, Dell, HP, and Toshiba).
Together, they account for two-thirds of the domestic market.
Through their websites, I ordered a basic unit with no extra bells
and whistles, just the standard hardware and software included
in the purchase price.
Most of you have probably done something like this yourselves. But then I did something you didn't. I paid attention to
the boilerplate. In fact, I .kept track of every form contract to
which I bec.lme bound in the course of these four
transactions. Why? Because I wanted to measure the
cost to the consumer of actually doing what the
law thinks we should do: read all those tenns.
My approach was conservative; I included
only contracts to which I explicitly expressed
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Now that you've read and compared boilerplate from
four computers, send your signal to the marketplace.

Select the computer
with the best specs and
most favorable terms, and
register your rejection of
the unfavorable boilerplate
by returning the rejected
computers. Then, hope for
your refund. Good luck!
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consent and whose terms were easy to locate.1 In other words, I
included only contracts that a court would deafly enforce against me.
The result? Even with my conservative approach, each

purchase produced, on average, 25 binding contracts totaling
74,897 words. To put that in perspective, it's just a tad fewer
words than in the first Harry Potter book. Of course, Harry
Potter is a page-turner, whereas boilerplate contracts are anything
but. So perhaps a better analogy is tax forms: you could read
every word of the instruction booklet for IRS Form 1040a, cover
to cover, all 88 pages, and still be more than a thousand words
short of the boilerplate total from a single computer purchase.
(Or the truly masochistic can try reading a typical law review
article, then reading it again, and then once more. Without skipping the footnotes.)
How long would it take the average consumer to read all
those terms? Based on studies of reading rates of legal texts, the
average reading time for 74,897 words of boilerplate would be
just over seven hours. So if you want to send an informed signal
to the marketplace about the tenns of computer contracts, set
aside almost a full working day. And even at that slow rate, studies show that comprehension is pretty poor.
But wait-computers are expensive. One should expect
to spend some time checking them out before parting with so
much money. I addressed this issue by expressing the consumer's
burden in dollars per word. Even under this metric, the burden
is high: 93 words per dollar spent. Imagine having to read 93
words of boilerplate each time you buy a can of soda, 279 words
when buying a $3 gallon of milk, or 5,580 words when filling a
20-gallon tank with gas.
What's more, these figures probably underestimate the cost
to consumers of reading the fine print because competition
works best when consumers can compare products. To really
send an informed signal to the marketplace, a consumer would
have to read the boilerplate from more than one product. Some
contracts will be the same from seller to seller-for example, all
four here use the same Wmdows license-but it would still take
more than 15 hours just to read the various contracts of these
four sellers, let alone the time it would talce to analyze and weigh
their differences.
And it gets worse. Of the 74,897 average words, only 7,698
were presented to me before my purchase. That's about one in ten.
The other 90 percent revealed themselves only after the computer
arrived and I started it up. So if you really want to "shop" for boilerplate, you have to order multiple computers, await their arrival,
start them all up, open the various programs, and then examine
the boilerplate within. Only then could you register your rejection
of boilerplate terms with the marketplace--e.g., by returning the
rejected computers and receiving refunds. Good luck with that.
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What does all this mean? With computer purchases, at least,
it means that the cost of actually reading the fine print is so high
that doing so is irrational; consumers who don't read are being
smart, not lazy. Consequently, the market is doing nothing to
regulate the terms of boilerplate. The market will respond if Dell
charges a high price, but if Dell buries a pro-seller provision in
its boilerplate (really just a subtle way of raising the price, right?),
consumers will have no idea, and the market will not pressure
Dell to remove it. And that means there's little reason to enforce
the contract.
Mine is not the only study that tracks the costs of reading
contracts, although it is the only one that follows consumers all
the way through a transaction. Despite the mounting evidence
that consumers don't read, some scholars argue that boilerplate
should be enforced. One theory is that some subset of consumers
reads, and the readers can represent the rest of us. That sometimes happens-witness the recent public outcry over lnstagram's
changes to its user terms-but those instances are very rare
exceptions to the rule. Another theory is that these terms don't
matter-that sellers ignore them juSt as much as consumers
do-and that disputes are handled as customer service issues, not
legal matters. But this argument proves too much; if that's the
case, why bother with boilerplate terms at all? Why bother to pay
attorneys to write them and Il)ake courts enforce them if no one
cares about them? It would be cheaper. -~or seller and consumer
alike to do away with them.
No, the fact is that these terms do-'' matter. It's in the fine
print that you promise to arbitrate ra~her th_an iitigate. It's in
the fine print that you agree to pay Dell a restocking fee, allow
Microsoft to share your private information, arid limit the remedies you can claim against McAfee. It's in the fine print that you
agree to waive participation in a class action suit.
Reasonable people can disagree about whether waiving class
actions or paying restocking fees is a good thing. But the whole
point of the competitive free market is that we do not make these
decisions for each other. Rather, each of us makes an individual
decision, and the market responds accordingly. That almost
never happens with consumer contracts. Their length and manner of presentation actively discourage it.
When we fail to read, we fail to malce individual decisions,
and the market fails as well. Contract law needs to catch up with
this reality.

Jim Gibson is a professor and the director of the Intellectual
Property Institute at Richmond Law. This article derives .from a
publication, "Vertical Boiletplate, "forthcoming in Washington
& Lee Law Review.

